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In October, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down a
landmark judgment dealing with the Central European University (CEU). It found that
Hungary had violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by failing
to provide national treatment to the CEU. It was obvious that the case, although
wrapped in trade law, had absolutely nothing to do with international trade: it was
an EU rule of law dispute between the European Commission (Commission) and
Hungary. The reason why it was not presented as such was that the EU reckoned
that it had no power to address the rule of law issue directly and, hence, had resort
to some “legal finesse”. The ruling fits in a relatively sizeable list of cases where the
CJEU employed Al Capone tricks to foster rule of law. As is well-known, Al Capone
was not convicted for what he should have been but for what he could be (tax fraud).
In the same vein, at times, the Commission used the “supportive by-effects” of
apparently unconnected EU norms.
However, it remains to be seen if the moral victory can be turned into meaningful
practical results. In the last decade, the Commission was “legally” successful
in Commission v Hungary, but the judgment was unable to reinstate the
dismissed judges into their original positions. The saga of the Hungarian NGO law
(Transparency of Associations) shows that outright judicial victory does not imply
immediate national implementation: the law quashed in June by the CJEU is still
applicable in Hungary, its repeal being currently pending. In the case of the CEU,
the damage is irreparable. The university has moved to Vienna and will not return to
Hungary.
The CEU judgment both marks a victory in the rule-of-law debate and showcases the
limits of Al Capone tricks. The assessment of the ruling hinges on one’s expectations
and counter-factual. If compared to the EU’s very weak rule-of-law powers, the
CJEU’s ruling is a great success: The Commission, again, won an uphill battle. If
compared to the ideal outcome featuring an effective remedy, the ruling is intensely
disappointing.
The CEU saga and the EU’s limping rule of law
The CEU is a postgraduate higher education institution registered in the US and
located in Hungary. The University had no operations in the US but the programs
it offered in Hungary were accredited in the state of New York. The CEU had been
complying with the requirements of Hungarian higher education law for nearly three
decades. However, in 2017, the Hungarian parliament amended the law to require
foreign non-European universities to operate on the basis of an intergovernmental
agreement and to have a campus in the country of registration. These requirements
went into effect with remarkable pace and the CEU felt compelled to move to Austria.
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The amending law featured a blatant disrespect for academic freedom and legitimate
expectations and raised serious concerns under the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Nonetheless, the Charter does not apply to Member States acting in purely
domestic matters: it applies to EU institutions and Member States acting as the EU’s
“agents”, but does not have genuine diagonal application.
The European Commission’s “constitutional
finesse”: Al Capone tricks
The EU has developed various techniques to overcome the problems that emerge
from the virtual lack of diagonal enforcement powers. Besides conceiving the
scope of EU law widely to extend the horizontal application of EU rule of law, the
Commission has employed creative “Al Capone tricks.” For instance, in Commission
v Hungary, discrimination based on age was used to protect the independence
of the judiciary. The predicament of the CEU inspired another such trick. Under
GATS and the EU’s Schedule of Specific Commitments, US entities had the right to
market access and national treatment in the higher education service sector. The
amendment to the higher education law could be judged under these requirements,
as here economic and academic freedom overlapped.
The application of the GATS raised a dilemma. On the one hand, GATS offered
a neat legal basis to protect the Central European University. On the other hand,
WTO law’s direct effect has been consistently rejected by the CJEU and there was
not even the slightest intention to change this. WTO law has no direct effect in any
of the major trading nations and overruling this case-law was out of the question:
this would have had devastating economic consequences for the EU and seriously
handicapped its bargaining position in international trade disputes.
The CJEU has had a somewhat unsteady relationship with the application of
WTO law in the EU’s legal order. The CJEU, with some very narrow exceptions,
has consistently rejected WTO law as a valid legal basis for invalidation of EU
measures and actions for damages against the EU. The narrow exceptions have
been interpretative use and measures incorporating WTO law. The Court’s reasons
have been very pragmatic: WTO law leaves ample room for political action and
none of the EU’s major trading partners grant WTO law direct effect; hence, the
EU’s unilateral opening of its legal space would result in a serious competitive
disadvantage.
The CJEU’s intellectual challenge was to establish an EU competence without
exposing the EU and its Member States to WTO-law-based claims, in particular
claims for damages.
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The CJEU’s ruling in CEU: how can you have your
cake and eat it too?
The Court had addressed the question if, in the European legal sphere, the legality
of the EU’s actions could be judged on the basis WTO law, but the CJEU had never
really been confronted with a case where the Commission attempted to force a
Member State’s compliance via an infringement procedure.
The key to the solution was that the CJEU did not conceive WTO law’s applicability
as an “all or nothing” question. WTO law’s application to the EU, as the master of
European commercial policy, on the one hand, and the Commission’s endeavor to
make Member States comply with it, on the other, are two different issues. While
the first impairs the EU’s bargaining position and exposes it to gargantuan claims
for damages, the latter actually strengthens it. Commercial policy is an exclusive EU
competence, and the EU can be held accountable not merely for its own infractions,
but also for those of the Member States. Hence, it should have the power to compel
Member States to comply with these international obligations. Furthermore, WTO
law may be applicable without having direct effect: The Commission may launch an
infringement procedure even in cases where the legal instrument cannot be invoked
before Member State courts.
Using the above distinction, the CJEU held that the Commission could validly rely
on the provisions of the GATS in CEU to ensure that the EU would not incur any
international liability in a situation where there is a risk of a dispute being brought
before the WTO and found that Hungary had breached these provisions.
The Take-away
The CJEU overcame the intellectual challenge presented by CEU very smartly. The
solution adopted (“confined invokability”) ensured that the EU can have its cake
and eat it too. WTO law may be relied on by the Commission to compel a Member
State’s compliance via an infringement procedure. On the other hand, WTO law
cannot be invoked against EU institutions and still lacks direct effect. It also cannot
be invoked before Member State courts and actions for damages (against either
the EU or the Member States) are still not admissible. The application of WTO law
is limited to infringement procedures launched by the Commission. This internal
enforcement power is justified by the EU’s external liability: International commerce
is an exclusive EU competence and, hence, the EU can be held to account even for
the infringements of the Member States. The external power should have its mirror-
image in the internal legal sphere. Nonetheless, as a corollary of this rationale,
standing is strictly limited to the Commission and claims for damages are admissible
neither against the EU nor the Member States. This was the compromise that
reconciled the EU’s commercial policy interests and academic freedom.
The Court’s ruling in CEU made two important contributions to the case-law.
First, although initially it may have appeared to be a long shot, WTO law could be
used effectively to protect fundamental liberties. Second, the Court established
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the Commission’s power to compel Member States’ compliance with WTO law.
Nonetheless, actions against the EU still appear to be inadmissible, the same as
actions against Member States if not launched by the Commission.
Victory in court and victory in real life
Unfortunately, the last decade has shown that a victory in the courtroom does not
necessarily imply victory in real life. The Commission was successful in Commission
v Hungary, but the judgment was unable to reinstate the dismissed judges into
their original positions. The saga of the Hungarian NGO law (Transparency of
Associations) shows that outright judicial victory does not imply immediate national
implementation: the law quashed in June by the CJEU is still applicable in Hungary,
its repeal being currently pending. Furthermore, never-ending stories may emerge:
as in case of the dispute concerning Hungary’s asylum system, the rules quashed by
the Court may be replaced with a regime raising other concerns under EU law.
The judgment marks a significant victory in the rule-of-law debate, however, it also
showcases the limits of Al Capone tricks. Notwithstanding the victory before the
Court, the CEU had to move most of its operations to Austria, incurring massive
expenses. Given the CJEU’s distinction between WTO law’s direct effect and the
Commission’s power to compel Member States’ compliance, the CEU’s chances to
get a recovery are minimal. Opening the door to actions for damages would very
much impair the interests of the EU’s commercial policy. At the same time, the lack
of retrospective remedy opens the floor to repetitious “hit-and-run” violations: novel
requirements and new hurdles replacing the one’s condemned.
After the CJEU’s ruling in CEU, Hungary’s justice minister announced that “as
always, Hungary will implement the judgment of the European Court of Justice in
the interest of the Hungarian people.” This may mean either that the judgment will
be implemented because this is the interest of the Hungarian people, or it will be
implemented in a way that it is in accordance with the interest of the Hungarian
people or it will be implemented to the extent this is in the interest of the Hungarian
people. It will be seen soon which option is correct. Nonetheless, whatever the
meaning of this statement is, one thing remains certain: The operation apparently
was successful, but the patient died.
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